El plan aleman: Deportacion forzosa

 

Dos noticias del Bundesbank bastan para conocer la ingenieria de deportacion europea disenada en el cuartel general del ordoliberalismo:

1.In its monthly report for April the Bundesbank argues that Germany will need between 150.000 and 200.000 immigrants per year over the next years to fill jobs if the country wants to maintain its growth potential, Financial Times Deutschland writes. The German central bank also argues that child care must be improved so that people with „family obligation“ can better participate in the labour market. The Bundesbank also argues for a longer working hours. The central bank argues that scarcety in the labour market also threatens price stability since it will very likely „lead to a stronger wage growth“.

2.Weidmann insistió en que el BCE y los gobiernos deben mantener la actual trayectoria, ya que los riesgos que conllevan los recortes de presupuestos están sobrestimados. “Los riesgos de la consolidación están siendo exagerados. En cualquier caso, hay pocas alternativas” Así, insistió en que el BCE podría subir los tipos para frenar la inflación si viera que los precios suben más rápido que su meta de cerca pero por debajo del 2%. “Las autoridades monetarias deben hacer lo que sea necesario una vez que los riesgos sobre la inflación de la zona euro aumenten”, afirmó.

Gramsci siempre dijo que lo mas peligroso era un tonto bienintenciando! Yo tengo mis dudas.

2 comentarios en “El plan aleman: Deportacion forzosa

  1. I hope not to appear rude, but the rnceet theme here seems less bond vigilantism and more inflation apologism. Do you really think that rates can be held at emergency levels over 2 years (2 years!) after the peak of the crisis, without a whole heap of undesirable, unintended consequences developing? No one is suggesting that the very first tentative steps towards normalising rates will be consequence-free, but it should be very clear by now that the alternative, that of maintaining emergency-level rates and unprecedented monetary stimulus, are themselves far from consequence free, not least in terms of the central banks in question retaining their credibility.

  2. I hope not to appear rude, but the rnceet theme here seems less bond vigilantism and more inflation apologism. Do you really think that rates can be held at emergency levels over 2 years (2 years!) after the peak of the crisis, without a whole heap of undesirable, unintended consequences developing? No one is suggesting that the very first tentative steps towards normalising rates will be consequence-free, but it should be very clear by now that the alternative, that of maintaining emergency-level rates and unprecedented monetary stimulus, are themselves far from consequence free, not least in terms of the central banks in question retaining their credibility.

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